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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Dwight Earl Reber appeals from the order of the district court summarily
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court summarized the underlying criminal, initial post-conviction, and
federal habeas corpus proceedings as follows:
In the underlying criminal matter, Kootenai County Case No. CR00-8852, Petitioner, Mr. Reber, was found guilty by jury verdict of one
count of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen on April 3, 2001. On
May 17, 2001, Mr. Reber was sentenced to a fixed 4 years, and
indeterminate 12 years, for a total of 16 years. . . . The Idaho Court of
Appeals affirmed Mr. Reber's judgment of conviction and sentence on
October 30, 2002. The Idaho Court of Appeals filed a remittitur on
January 17, 2003.
On December 10, 2002, Mr. Reber filed a petition for PostConviction Relief. Mr. Reber's petition was based upon three grounds:
prosecutorial misconduct, "errors of fact that the court would not allow
[him] to personally challenge on direct cross-examination," and twenty
three [sic] items of ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citation omitted.]
On September 23, 2003, Judge Mitchell filed an Order Dismissing PostConviction Relief Petition and Memorandum Decision. . . . [T]he Idaho
Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Mitchell's decision on May 9, 2005. (CV
2002 8470 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 'Petitioner's Motion
to Reconsider Dismissal of Post Conviction Relief Petition Objection";
Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho, 2005 Unpublished Opinion No.
453).
On February 2, 2006, Mr. Reber filed a federal Habeas Corpus
Petition "alleging that (1) his right to due process of law was violated
because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, (2) his conviction and sentence
are 'illegal," in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Fourteenth
Amendments, and (3) he was denied his right to self-representation and
the effective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Reber v. Conway, 2007 WL 1981797 (D. Idaho 2007)
(emphasis added). On March 14, 2007, the Honorable Edward J. Lodge,
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U.S. District Judge, dismissed, among other things, the portion of Mr.
Reber's claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
On November 21, 2007, Judge Lodge dismissed, with prejudice,
Mr. Reber's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On January 29, 2008, Mr.
Reber received an order denying his application for a Certificate of
Appealability.
(R., pp.25-27 (footnote omitted, emphasis original).)
On November 20, 2012, Reber, through appointed counsel, filed a successive
post-conviction petition.

(R., pp.1-4.)

The State filed an answer, which included a

motion for dismissal. (R., pp.5-7, 16-19.) Reber filed, on his own, a Motion to Amend
the Post Conviction Petition.

(Aug., 1 1/11/13 "Motion to Amend Post Conviction

Petition.") Subsequently, Mr. Rebe r's appointed counsel filed a Brief in Support of Post
Conviction Relief, and the state filed a response. (R., pp.8-19.) The court filed a Notice
of Intent to Dismiss Post-Conviction Relief Petition, and Reber filed a reply on his own.
(R., pp.20-24; Aug., 3/28/13 Notice of Intent (etc.).) About ten days after the court filed
its notice, Reber filed a Motion to Withdraw Public Defender and Appoint Conflict
Counsel with a supporting affidavit. (Aug., 4/8/13 Motion to Withdraw (etc.).) On April
18, 2013, the court entered a Decision on Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, summarily
dismissing Reber's successive post-conviction petition on the bases that it is "time
barred under I. C. § 19-4902(a) and barred under I. C. § 19-4908," and a Judgment of
Dismissal. (R., pp.25-37.) Reber filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.43-46.)

1

"Aug." refers to this Court's "Order Granting Motion to Augment the Record," entered
March 17, 2014.
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ISSUE
Reber states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in failing to rule on Mr. Reber's motion to appoint
conflict counsel?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Reber failed to show error in the denial of his motion for the appointment of
substitute counsel to pursue his successive post-conviction claims?

3

ARGUMENT
Reber Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion For The Appointment Of
Substitute Counsel To Pursue His Successive Post-Conviction Claims
A.

Introduction
During the successive post-conviction proceedings, Reber filed a "Motion to

Withdraw Public Defender and Appoint Conflict Counsel."

(Aug., 4/8/13 Motion to

Withdraw (etc.).) No action on that motion is reflected in the record. The district court
subsequently granted the state's motion to summarily dismiss Reber's successive
petition.

(R., pp.25-35.)

On appeal, Reber contends the district court abused its

discretion by not inquiring about, or ruling on, his motion to appoint conflict counsel
before summarily dismissing his successive petition.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.)

Application of the correct legal standards shows no reversible error by the district court.

B.

Standard Of Review
"[T]he decisior:, of whether to appoint substitute counsel lies within the discretion

of the trial court and will only be reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Lippert,
152 Idaho 884, 887, 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted); see also I.C.
§ 19-856 (repealed effective July 1, 2013) (trial court may, for good cause, appoint
substitute counsel).

C.

Reber Had No Sixth Amendment Right To Be Represented By Counsel In His
Successive Post-Conviction Proceeding
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel

during all "critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him. Estrada v. State,
143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
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218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 P.2d 415 (1981)). Although this
right encompasses the first direct appeal, it does not extend to post-conviction
proceedings.

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007); Pennsylvania v.

Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). See also Murphy v. State, _

P.3d _ , 2014 WL

712695, *5 (Idaho 2014) (pet. for reh'g pending) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 752 (1991 )) ('"[T]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state postconviction proceedings."').

Because Reber had no constitutional right to counsel to

pursue his successive post-conviction claims, his argument on appeal that the district
court had a duty under the Sixth Amendment to inquire regarding the basis of Reber's
request for substitute counsel necessarily fails. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.)

D.

The Trial Court's Decision Whether To Appoint Substitute Counsel Pursuant To
I.C. § 19-856 Was Discretionary And Not Subject To The Procedures Necessary
To Safeguard The Constitutional Right To Conflict-Free Counsel In The Critical
Stages Of A Criminal Case
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to represent

a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to I.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary. Charboneau v.
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682,
683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). Although Reber had no right to appointed
counsel, he was represented by the county public defender in his successive postconviction proceeding.

(See Aug., 12/1/11 Order Granting Motion for Appointment of

Counsel.) Citing the standards applicable to the right to conflict-free counsel conferred
by the Sixth Amendment, Reber argues on appeal that "the district court had a duty of
inquiry once Mr. Reber filed his motion to withdraw the public defender and appoint
conflict counsel."

(Appellant's Brief, p.1 O; see generally id., pp.5-11.)
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Reber's

arguments fail on their premise.

The district court's decision whether to appoint

substitute counsel in his successive post-conviction proceeding was not governed or
guided by the procedures required by the Sixth Amendment to safeguard the right to
conflict-free counsel in the critical stages of a criminal case.

Two cases, Murphy v.

State,_ P.3d _ , 2014 WL 712695 (Idaho 2014) (pet. for reh'g pending), and RiosLopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007), are dispositive of
Reber's cliams.
In Murphy, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed in what circumstances a statutory
"right" to counsel also carries with it the guarantees of effective assistance of counsel
and conflict-free counsel. Murphy, _

P.3d at_, 2014 WL 712695, *6. The Court

distinguished between statutes that mandate the appointment of post-conviction
counsel versus those that leave the decision to appoint counsel within the district court's
discretion.

kl

Citing Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2, which "provides for the mandatory

appointment of counsel for post-conviction review after the imposition of the death
penalty," the Court noted its recent holding in Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, _ , 315
P.3d 798, 804 (2013), "that post-conviction petitioners sentenced to death have the right
to conflict-free counsel." Murphy, _

P.3d at_, 2014 WL 712695, *6. The Court

then contrasted Rule 44.2 with I.C. § 19-4904, which leaves the decision to appoint
post-conviction counsel in a non-capital case within the discretion of the district court.

kl

Because the appointment of counsel under l.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary, the

Murphy Court observed that that statute does not even "create a statutory right to postconviction counsel," id. (citing Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 291, 17 P.3d 230, 235
(2000)), much less a right to the effective assistance of counsel in non-capital post-
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conviction proceedings. See

~

("Where there is no right to counsel, there can be no

deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel."). Thus, the Court effectively held
that only statutes making the appointment of counsel mandatory confer upon indigent
litigants the right, normally associated with the Sixth Amendment, to the effective
assistance of counsel.
Recognizing that a post-conviction petitioner has no constitutional or statutory
right to counsel, the Idaho Court of Appeals held in Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340,
160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007), that the procedures required to rule on a request for
substitute counsel made by a criminal defendant with a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel do not apply in post-conviction proceedings. The Court reasoned:
[W]e are not persuaded by Rios-Lopez's reliance on cases addressing the
procedures necessary to rule on a criminal defendant's request to
substitute counsel in criminal proceedings. See State v. Nath, 137 Idaho
712, 715, 52 P.3d 857, 860 (2002); State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898,
606 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1980); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711,713,946 P.2d
1351, 1353 (Ct. App. 1997). Both a criminal defendant and an applicant
for post-conviction relief may be appointed a substitute counsel if good
cause is shown for such substitution. See I.C. § 19-856. However,
determining whether good cause exists to substitute counsel for a criminal
defendant differs from determining whether good cause exists to
substitute counsel for an applicant for post-conviction relief because the
underlying rights to counsel differ.
A criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to counsel; but, in Idaho, an applicant for postconviction relief does not even have a statutory right to counsel. See
Follinus, 127 Idaho at 902 & n. 1, 908 P.2d at 595 & n. 1. See also I.C. §
19-4904. Indeed, a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel may not be brought because the applicant for post-conviction
relief does not have a right to effective assistance of counsel. See
Follin us, 127 Idaho at 902-03, 908 P .2d at 595-96. Because Nath,
Clayton, and Peck address the procedures necessary to protect a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in
criminal proceedings, those cases are inapposite.
Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343-44, 160 P.3d at 1278-79.

Cases addressing "the

procedures necessary to protect a criminal defendant's constitutional right to effective
7

assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings" are likewise "inapposite" in this case
because, as already discussed above, Reber had no constitutional or statutory right to
the assistance of counsel to pursue his successive post-conviction claims.
Reber's request for substitute counsel was governed by the former I.C. § 19-856,
which provided, "[a]t any stage, including appeal or other post-conviction proceeding,
the court concerned may for good cause assign a substitute attorney."

(Emphasis

added). Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, the decision whether to appoint
substitute counsel is discretionary. Accord State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 702, 215
P.3d 414, 422 (2009); State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, _ , 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App.
2012). Because the statute makes substitution of counsel discretionary, and because
Reber had no constitutional or statutory right to be represented by counsel to pursue his
successive post-conviction claims, the procedures mandated by the Sixth Amendment
to guarantee effective assistance - such as the duty to inquire into conflicts of interest did not apply. Murphy,_ P.3d. at_, 2014 WL712695, *6; Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at
343-44, 160 P .3d at 1278-79. Rebe r's assertions to the contrary are without merit.

E.

Even If Reber Had A Right To Counsel, He Has Failed To Show The District
Court Had A Duty To Inquire About, Or Rule Upon, His Conflict-Based Motion
For Substitute Counsel
Assuming, arguendo, Reber had either or both a statutory or constitutional right

to counsel to pursue his successive post-conviction claims, he has failed to show the
existence of any "actual conflict of interest" that would have mandated the appointment
of substitute counsel. Reber contends, "once he requested that his attorney withdraw
and that conflict counsel be appointed, the court was required to inquire into the alleged
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conflict. Because the district court did nothing, Mr. Reber asserts that the district court
erred." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.)
Reber has failed to show error in the district court's lack of inquiry and ruling on
his conflict-based motion for substitute counsel prior to summarily dismissing the claims
in his successive petition. In Hall, 155 Idaho at_, 315 P.3d at 807, a capital case, the
Idaho Supreme Court explained:
As the Supreme Court stated in Mickens v. Taylor, an inquiry is
only required "when 'the trial court knows or reasonably should know that
a particular conflict exists,' which is not to be confused with when the trial
court is aware of a vague, unspecified possibility of conflict." 535 U.S.
162, 168-69, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1241, 152 L.Ed.2d 291, 301-02 (2002)
(quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1717, 64
L.Ed.2d 333, 346 (1980)). Both Mickens and Cuyler involved a possible
conflict arising from defense counsel's representation of multiple codefendants, a situation that is more likely to give rise to a conflict than the
circumstances in this case. In Cuyler, the respondent was one of three
defendants accused of murder who were tried separately but represented
by the same counsel. In Cuyler, the Court noted that the separate trials
"significantly reduced the potential for a divergence in [the co-defendants']
interests" and ultimately held that no "special circumstances" triggered the
trial court's duty to inquire. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64
L.Ed. 2d at 346.
Here, the district court repeatedly referred to the Ex Parte Notice as
"vague" and indicated that it provided little to no information addressing
the potential conflict. Accordingly, the Ex Parte Notice in this case only
raised a "vague, unspecified possibility of conflict," which did not trigger
the district court's duty to inquire.l21

2

The Idaho Supreme Court further explained in Hall, 155 Idaho at_, 315 P.3d at
807:
In this case, the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice alerted the district court of
a "possible conflict of interest regarding the SAPD representing Hall in his
post-conviction proceedings." According to the Ex Parte Notice, the
potential conflict stemmed from sharing testing and expert information
between former SAPD attorneys representing Hall in Hall I post-conviction
proceedings and Hall's trial counsel in Hall II.
9

Accordingly, before the district court's duty to inquire is triggered, it must be
presented with more than a "vague and unspecified possibility of conflict."

kl

In order

for there to be a conflict of interest, there must be separate interests that actually
conflict. See,~. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 48182 (1978).
The so-called "conflict of interest" Reber asserted simply shows he was
dissatisfied with his counsel's petiormance, suspected counsel of having divided
loyalties, and took offense to a question his counsel asked about Reber's religion.
Reber's motion for substitute counsel asserted:
(1)

Reber asked counsel to subpoena evidence for his "requested
actual innocence claim[;]"

(2)

Counsel did not respond to Reber's written concerns and requests,
and then counsel filed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim;

(3)

Counsel said he could amend the successive petition, but did not;

(4)

Reber feels deceived by counsel because counsel allowed the
successive petition to be reviewed in light of summary dismissal;

(5)

Counsel originally failed to communicate for six months after being
appointed, and questioned whether Reber's Yahwist faith was a
Christian cult; and

(6)

Reber suspected counsel's lack of loyalty when counsel told Reber
he would appeal the judge's ruling anyway.

(Aug., 4/8/13 Motion to Withdraw (etc.), pp.1-2.)

After receiving the Ex Parte Notice, the district court concluded that
"it had reason to know that a particular conflict may exist." This was an
error because the Ex Parte Notice was insufficient to indicate the
existence of a conflict and was also insufficient to trigger the district court's
independent duty to inquire.
10

None of the above six allegations about Reber's counsel suggest an actual
conflict of interest.

The first four of Reber's complaints allege, at most, ineffective

assistance by trial counsel, not that counsel had a conflict of interest.

See State v.

Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 336, 193 P.3d 878, 883 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Notably, the right to
counsel does not necessarily mean a right to the attorney of one's choice, and mere
lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel is not necessarily grounds for
substitute counsel in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.") (citations omitted);
State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 594, 181 P.3d 512, 520 (Ct. App. 2007) (same)
(citations omitted).

Reber's own motion to withdraw and appoint conflict counsel

characterized his allegations as ineffective assistance claims, as follows:

"Petitioner

requests this Honorable Court to dismiss Attorney Whitaker for his 'ineffective
assistance' as attorney of record in case no. CV-12-8463, and appoint conflict-counsel;.

" (Id., pp.2-3 (emphasis added).)
Nor do Reber's last two allegations assert his trial counsel had an actual conflict
of interest. Reber contends his attorney questioned whether his Yahwist religion was a
Christian cult, and Reber suspected a lack of loyalty by counsel. Neither allegation, if
believed, shows an actual conflict of interest. Rather, like the allegations in Hall (see n.
1, supra), they evince no more than a "'vague, unspecified possibility of conflict,' which
did not trigger the district court's duty to inquire." Hall, 155 Idaho at_, 315 P.3d at
807 (quoting Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168-169).
In sum, even assuming every assertion by Reber is true, he did not allege
anything more than that his attorney arguably provided substandard assistance, that he
suspected his trial counsel was disloyal, and that trial counsel may have held a negative
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view of Reber's religion -- not that an actual conflict of interest existed. Reber has failed
to show the district court erred, much less abused its discretion, by not inquiring further
into his claim that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest. Accordingly, even if he had
the right to counsel in his successive post-conviction proceeding, Reber has failed to
show that the district court abused its discretion by granting the state's motion for
summary dismissal without first ruling on Reber's conflict-based motion for substitute
counsel.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
summarily dismissing Reber's successive petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 9th day of April, 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of April, 2014, served a true and
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to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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